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October 14, 1999, offered the unprecedented spectacle of the
Republican members of the United States Senate debating whether or not
they were corrupt. The leading advocate for the "yes" proposition was
Arizona Senator John McCain-presidential candidate, decorated Vietnam
War veteran, member of the infamous Keating Five, and a leading
proponent of campaign finance reform. Senator McCain insisted that the
existing system for financing political campaigns corrupted the entire
Senate.' Senator Mitch McConnell-the leading foe of standard campaign
finance reform efforts-protested that you cannot have corruption unless
somebody is corrupt, and he demanded that McCain name names.' McCain
refused because he saw the system as the problem, not the individuals
within it.3
Two subtexts weaved through the October 14 debate. The first involved
McCain's website, which suggested that Congress had been corrupted by
the relationship between pork barrel spending and campaign contributions.
That allegation angered his colleagues who had supported the named
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1. 145 CONG. REC. S12,586, S12,587, S12,590, S12,592 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statements
of Sen. McCain).
2. Id. at S12,585, S12,586, S12,590, S12,591 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statements of Sen.
McConnell).
3. Id. at S 12,590, S 12,592 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statements of Sen. McCain).
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spending projects, thus prompting one of the Senate's first debates about
the meaning of the materials posted on a website.4 The second subtext
centered on a book. Senator McCain quoted Elizabeth Drew's assertion in
The Corruption of American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why that
"[t]he culture of money dominates Washington as never before." 5*McCain
added, "Elizabeth Drew has it right.... The fact is, there is a pernicious
effect of money on the legislative process." 6 McCain's colleagues,
however, were not willing simply to accept Drew's judgment. Senator
Bennett insisted that Drew's opinions were unrelated to Senator McCain's
allegation that the Senate had become corrupt.' The Senate debate
continued over the course of the next week,' but the result was that the
Senate once again rejected the kinds of changes to the campaign finance
system that Drew, McCain, and others find essential.
Drew has written often and well about the American political system
and its follies. Her 1983 book Politics and Money: The New Road to
Corruption9 was widely cited by proponents of campaign finance reform,
and she addressed these and many related issues in her other books and her
years of political writing for various periodicals.1" In The Corruption of
4. Id. at S12,587-89 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (colloquy between Sens. Bennett and McCain)
(discussing funding for sewer infrastructure for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City); id.
at S12,591 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (colloquy between Sens. Gorton and McConnell) (discussing
a statutory exemption from environmental regulations for a Washington mine that was identified
on McCain's website as an example of pork barrel spending). The debate concerning the
campaign finance implications of those two congressional actions is analyzed infra text
accompanying notes 96-99.
5. ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND
WHY 61 (1999), quoted in 145 CONG. REC. S12,586 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
6. 145 CONG. REC. S12,586 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain). Senator
McCain stated, "I believe, as Elizabeth Drew has said, this system is wrong, it needs to be fixed,
and the influence of special interests has a pernicious effect on the legislative process." Id.
Senator McCain also added, "I will repeat again what Elizabeth Drew wrote in her book that this
process of money has done great damage to all of us and has had a pernicious and corrupting
effect on the process." Id. at S12,587 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999). Drew noted the October 14 debate
in an epilogue contained in the paperback edition of her book published in March 2000, where she
ascribed the colloquy about the meaning of corruption to "a smear campaign on the part of some
Republican senators who disliked McCain intensely." ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 274-75 (The Overlook Press 2000)
(1999).
7. 145 CONG. REC. S12,588 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
8. See id. at S12,660-81 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1999); id. at S12,734-76 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1999);
id. at S12,803-31 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999).
9. ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983). The
book, which was based on a series of articles that Drew wrote for the New Yorker, was featured in
much of the ensuing literature advocating campaign finance reform. For academic reviews of the
book, see Richard Briffault, The Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 2083 (1984); and Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New
Road to Contradiction?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 939 (1985).
10. Most of Drew's earlier books documented specific periods of recent American political
history. E.g., ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GINGRICH
CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE (1996); ELIZABETH DREW, WASHINGTON
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American Politics, she argues that American politics have been corrupted
by a number of factors-especially money, but not just money. She
presents a variety of anecdotes told by members of Congress, their staffs,
lobbyists, reformers, corporate executives, and media personalities, all of
which portray a democratic process gone bad.1' She spends much less time
describing solutions to those problems, but she does identify several actions
that could eliminate the corruption and restore virtue to Washington. 2
Traditional campaign finance reform measures feature prominently in
Drew's list of solutions, but she also emphasizes that the people themselves
can achieve many worthwhile results simply by pressuring their elected
representatives. 3
Many politicians, judges, and other observers have reached the same
conclusion as Drew. Senator Joseph Lieberman asserted that Drew's
evaluation of the role of money in politics "once was nursed by a few
public interest groups and then a group of congressional reformers. Now, it
constitutes conventional wisdom." 4 At the oral argument in Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, which occurred days before the October
14 Senate debate, Justice Souter stated, "I think most people assume-I do,
certainly-that someone making an extraordinarily large contribution is
going to get some kind of an extraordinary return for it." 15 His ensuing
opinion for the Court reflects that belief.' 6 But the October 14 debate shows
how strongly many legislators resist the charge of corruption, while
reformers have been frustrated in their efforts to legislate new campaign
finance proposals addressing their vision of corruption. The colloquy that
occurred in the Senate on October 14 was unique among the many recent
JOURNAL: THE EVENTS OF 1973-1974 (1975). For examples of her most recent writing, see
Elizabeth Drew, Fortunate Son's Unfortunate Team, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2000, at A31, which
encourages George W. Bush to employ advisers to John McCain in his presidential campaign; and
Elizabeth Drew, Let's Destroy These Two Myths, Once and for All, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000,
at B I, which argues that standard campaign finance reform efforts do not violate free speech
rights.
11. DREW, supra note 5, at 19-85.
12. Id. at 268-71.
13. Id. at 268 (explaining how fear and embarrassment can cause politicians to change the
existing system); id. at 271 ("Only if the citizens hold their government to account, demand that
their politicians meet a higher standard, and that they fix the most fundamental problem in our
political system today, might Americans have a government they can feel better about.").
14. 145 CONG. REC. S12,829 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Lieberman); see
also Joseph Lieberman, Campaign Finance, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 5, 5 (1999) (repeating the same
praise of Drew's book).
15. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S.
Ct. 897 (2000) (No. 98-963), 1999 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 76, at *27. Justice Souter's observation
was quoted during the Senate debate two weeks later. 145 CONG. REC. S12,680, S12,772 (daily
ed. Oct. 18, 1999) (statements of Sen. Feingold).
16. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 908 ("[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large
contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the
existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters.").
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congressional campaign finance debates because it crystallized what divides
the Senate: the contested issue of what constitutes corruption.
This Review evaluates Drew's contention that American politics have
been corrupted. In Part I of this Review, I examine what Drew says went
wrong and why. Drew's account emphasizes the role of campaign money in
politics, but she also identifies concerns about incivility and partisanship.
These concerns are, however, compromised by her own incivility and
partisanship. Part U of this Review evaluates the dispute about the nature of
corruption. The disagreement among Drew, the Senate, and the Court
suggests that the problem might lie in the standard reliance on the word
"corruption." In Part III, I explore another metaphor for the influence of
campaign spending on our political system. Nearly twenty years ago, D.C.
Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright suggested that money pollutes the system.17
He did not develop that image, yet it continues to resurface in the debate
over campaign finance reform. Part III considers whether the problems
associated with campaign finance are an instance of pollution, and what the
implications of that metaphor are for efforts to remedy what Drew says has
gone wrong with American politics. The pollution metaphor is more helpful
than the contested image of corruption in several respects. Pollution targets
the harmful influence of money as an outside agent; it better captures the
systemic concerns voiced by Drew and McCain alike; and it avoids the
connotation of individual blameworthiness to which McConnell and other
senators objected. It thus offers a better vehicle for examining the difficult
empirical questions regarding the cause and effect of campaign money.
Moreover, the way in which pollution can be cleaned up says much about
the wisdom of current campaign finance reform proposals.
The pollution metaphor adds these insights to the typical understanding
of the campaign finance problem. But while pollution usually connotes
contaminated water, dirty air, or other environmental hazards, it possesses
additional meanings that are closer to what Drew, Senator McCain, Judge
Wright, and others see in the political system. Cultural pollution caused by
violent, pornographic, and hateful entertainment media and many other
sources has sparked a parallel debate concerning the propriety of
government regulation of such pollution. Most of the efforts to regulate
Internet decency, hate speech, and the like have failed to survive judicial
review employing the strict scrutiny imposed by the First Amendment.
From that perspective, the hardest question raised by the pollution
metaphor-the constitutionality of governmental efforts to regulate
pollution caused by expressive activities-suggests that the standard efforts
17. J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
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to reform the campaign finance system are problematic whether they are
viewed as eliminating pollution, corruption, or both.
I. WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY
Drew characterizes the failure of the campaign finance system
established in the aftermath of Watergate as the most serious of the
problems with our democracy today. But that is not her only concern.
The second chapter of the book-entitled "What's Happened to
Washington?" -offers the most systematic account of the problems that
Drew sees. They include the increased selfishness and decreased
disinterestedness of politicians, a decline in the quality of politicians, the
increased partisanship of politicians, and a decline in civility in the political
process. Drew spends little time addressing the causes of those ills, yet she
seems to assume that the broken campaign finance system is to blame for
them, too.
Drew skillfully combines several chapters recounting recent episodes in
the struggle for campaign finance reform and American politics more
generally with other chapters containing her normative arguments about the
problems ailing American politics. The historical chapters detail the
campaign finance hearings headed by Senator Fred Thompson, the 1998
Senate debate on campaign finance legislation, and the saga of President
Clinton's impeachment."i The normative analysis examines those stories
and countless interviews with Washington figures in an effort to explain
how money and other ills have corrupted the political system and what can
be done about it. 9 The overall picture, consistent with the book's subtitle,
details "what went wrong" with the American political system, offers a
number of explanations for "why" that happened, and generally leaves the
appropriate responses for another day.
18. DREw, supra note 5, at 3-18 (describing the formation of Senator Fred Thompson's
committee to investigate campaign fundraising practices in the 1996 elections); id. at 86-141
(recounting the work of the Thompson committee); id. at 164-210 (describing the unsuccessful
congressional efforts to enact campaign finance reform in 1997 and 1998); id. at 211-58 (narrating
the impeachment and acquittal of President Clinton).
19. Id. at 19-42 (analyzing "what went wrong in Washington" apart from campaign finance
woes); id. at 43-60 (discussing First Amendment objections to campaign finance reform); id. at
61-85 (detailing the "money culture" that now pervades Washington); id. at 151-63 (criticizing
President Clinton for injuring the presidency); id. at 259-71 (explaining why there is "reason for
hope" that the system can be repaired).
20001
The Yale Law Journal
A. What Went Wrong
1. Corrupted Politics
Money has corrupted Congress. That is the simple lesson from the
extended stories that Drew tells about the Senate hearings on campaign
finance abuses, the Senate debate on campaign finance reform, and the
interviews with members of Congress and private interests reported in the
book's chapter on "The Money Culture."20 Drew asserts that money has
influenced the government--especially Congress, but also the presidency-
in numerous harmful ways:
Money influences the legislative decisions of members of
Congress.
Money influences the outcome of election campaigns.
The need to gather enough money to run an effective campaign
distracts members of Congress from their legislative duties.
Money directs the career choices of Washington politicians.2'
In short, "[s]triving for and obtaining money has become the
predominant activity-and not just in electoral politics-and its
effects are pernicious." 2
Drew relies upon numerous anecdotes and personal interviews to
support her characterization of the growing and insidious role of money in
American politics. She quotes an unnamed former House member who
asserts that Texas Representatives Dick Armey and Tom DeLay "'have
used money to gain power."'2 3 She notes how contributions for such
diverse purposes as university chairs and military museums have become a
standard technique for obtaining access to government officials.24 Drew
recounts, for example, how the University of Tennessee established a chair
to honor Vice President Gore's late sister and how Gore's former chief
political fundraiser raised funds for the chair as well.25 Drew describes how
prodigious fundraising aids members of Congress as they strive to gain
20. Id. at 3-18, 86-141, 164-210 (describing congressional consideration of campaign finance
reforms); id. at 61-85 (explaining Washington's "money culture").
21. Id. at 61-85.
22. Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 68.
24. Id. at 69-73.
25. 1d. at 73.
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leadership positions within the House and the Senate.26 She cites numerous
instances of officials, senators, and representatives who pursued lucrative
positions once they left government service.27 She quotes a White House
memorandum explaining that staff briefings of President Clinton "'may be
considerably truncated or eliminated"' in order to accommodate the
President's coffees with individuals who had contributed at least $50,000.2
She explains that fundraising is so time-consuming that New Jersey Senator
Frank Lautenberg declined to run for reelection in part because he would
have to raise $3000 an hour for nearly two years. 29 And she quotes a
Democratic pollster who reported that politicians have "'utter contempt and
distaste for what they have to do day to day to raise money. They hate it.
There's nobody who doesn't think it's just a little bit unclean."' 30
Drew admits that efforts to use money to sway legislative and
administrative decisions are hardly new, but she insists that "never before
in the modern age has political money played the pervasive role that it does
now." 31 The book lacks the kind of detailed historical review to support her
contention that money plays a role in politics today that it never played
before. Drew could be dismissed as crying wolf, given that she made a
similar claim sixteen years earlier.32 And her claim that money pervades
everything that happens in Washington today fails to convince other
contemporary observers of American politics. Jonathan Rauch's account of
the ills that plague our democratic process contends that "[t]he growing
influence of money in politics .... may be a problem, but there is nothing
remotely new in it." 33
The absence of any historical support also troubles Drew's assertion
that money plays an increasing role in political campaigns. According to
Professor Bradley Smith, candidates paid their own modest election costs
until popular campaigning began around 1828.' Then government
employees whose jobs depended on their party's remaining in office
26. Id. at 68-69, 72-73.
27. Id at 62-64.
28. Id at 97.
29. Id. at 265.
30. Id. at 150 (quoting Mark Mellman).
31. Id. at61.
32. DREW, supra note 9, at vii (writing in 1983 that "in recent years, it became clear that the
distortions of the system and the pressures on the politicians caused by money had grown to the
point that they were making a qualitative change in the way the system worked"). Drew's 1983
book devoted two paragraphs to describing the role of money prior to the 1970s, id. at 6-7, in
contrast to the solitary sentence about Daniel Webster that appears in the 1999 book, DREW, supra
note 5, at 61 (noting that Webster "was on retainer from the Bank of the United States and at the
same time was one of its greatest defenders in the Congress").
33. JONATHAN RAUCH, GOVERNMENT'S END: WHY WASHINGTON STOPPED WORKING 15
(1999).
34. Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053-55 (1996).
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subsidized most campaigns until the Pendleton Act and state statutes
eliminated the vast number of patronage jobs in the 1880S. 31 Corporations
and wealthy individuals began funding campaigns only after funds from
government employees disappeared and as the effects of government
regulation on business interests increased.36 Many candidates received an
enormous proportion of their campaign funds from a small number of
moneyed interests. In the 1904 presidential election, for example, corporate
contributions accounted for over 73% of Theodore Roosevelt's campaign
funds, while a similar percentage of William Jennings Bryan's funds came
from two wealthy individuals.37 By contrast, the leading soft money
contributor to the Democratic Party in 1999 accounted for about 3% of the
party's total soft money receipts.3 Similarly, the leading soft money
contributor to the Republican Party in 1999 paid just less than $1,000,000,
which was an even smaller fraction of the party's total soft money receipts
and of the money raised by George W. Bush's presidential campaign.3 9 Or,
to judge the historical comparison in another way, the $450,000 that
Thomas Fortune Ryan contributed to William Jennings Bryan's 1904
presidential campaign would be worth $8,000,000 today, a sum that nearly
triples the $2,939,281 contributed by the Philip Morris Companies, the
greatest soft money contributor to a single party in 19 99 .40 The point is that,
while large contributions raise many questions about their intended purpose
and actual effect, Drew overstates her case when she suggests without
historical support that the phenomenon is worse today than ever before.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1054 (stating that Thomas Fortune Ryan contributed $450,000 to Bryan and
Augustus Belmont contributed $250,000).
38. Compare Common Cause, Chart VI: Top Overall Soft Money Donors to Democratic
Party Committees, January 1, 1999 Through December 31, 1999, at http://www.commoncause.
org/soft money/study99/chart6.html (visited Apr. 30, 2000) (indicating that the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees contributed $1,405,000 in soft money in
1999), with Common Cause, Chart Ill: Democratic Soft Money Industry Breakdown, Donor
Groups of $10,000 or More, January 1, 1999 Through December 31, 1999, at http://www.
commoncause.org/soft-money/study99/chart3.html (visited Apr. 30, 2000) (identifying over
$44,000,000 in soft money contributions to the party in 1999).
39. Compare Common Cause, Chart V: Top Overall Soft Money Donors to Republican Party
Committees, January 1, 1999 Through December 31, 1999, at http://www.commoncause.org/
soft.money/study99/chart5.html (visited Apr. 30, 2000) (indicating that Philip Morris contributed
$922,067 in soft money in 1999), with Common Cause, Chart II: Republican Soft Money Industry
Breakdown, Donor Groups of $10,000 or More, January 1, 1999 Through December 31, 1999,
at http://www.commoncause.org/softmoney/study99/chart2.html (visited Apr. 30, 2000)
(identifying over $49,000,000 in soft money contributions to the party in 1999), and Fed. Election
Comm'n, Receipts of 1999-2000 Presidential Campaigns Through February 29, 2000, at
http:/lwww.fec.gov/finance/precm3.htm (visited Apr. 30, 2000) (indicating that George W. Bush
had received $72,203,503 in contributions by the end of February 2000).
40. Common Cause, Top Soft Money Donors: January 1, 1999 Through December 31, 1999,
at http://www.commoncause.org/laundromat/topdonors99-new.htm (visited Sept. 4, 2000).
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2. Dysfunctional Politics
Drew characterizes the pervasive and insidious effect of money as the
most serious of the problems our democracy faces today. But that is not her
only concern. The second chapter of the book-entitled "What's Happened
to Washington?" -records a litany of ills that plague American politics
today.4 Most of them can be organized into a downward spiral of members
of Congress who are worse than ever before, a legislative and executive
process that has become dysfunctional, and a people who no longer esteem
their government.
Drew implies that we are now burdened with the worst collection of
representatives ever to serve in the U.S. Congress.42 To be sure, she
acknowledges that past Congresses have endured incompetence, corruption,
partisanship, and physical beatings.43 But she insists that things have gotten
worse on a variety of fronts, all of which have yielded a Congress filled
with men and women who are neither qualified nor interested in serving the
public good.' Drew rightly criticizes such behavior, sounding a call for
increased civility and bipartisanship that has been echoed by others across
the political spectrum, but her message suffers from two substantial
failings. First, she asserts, but fails to demonstrate, that conditions today are
significantly different than earlier periods of our history. More importantly,
she" is an imperfect messenger for that claim because much of her case
suffers from the same flaws that she perceives in many members of
Congress.
The book contends that our democracy suffers from a lack of civility
even as the book itself is remarkably lacking in civility. Drew rightly
echoes the common lament that members of Congress have become less
civil in their dealings with each other.45 She notes instances of name-
41. DREW, supra note 5, at 19-42.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 26-27.
44. Id. at 20-23.
45. E.g., Howard Baker, 1999 Stephenson Lecture, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 391, 393 (2000)
(asserting that "[t]here is too little civility in public service in the Congress of the United States
and the government of our country, to say nothing of civility among nations"); Kathleen M.
McGraw, Manipulating Public Opinion with Moral Justification, 560 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 129, 138 (1998) (stating that "[m]any observers have noted that the power of the
'courtesy norm' in Congress declined markedly in the 1980s and 1990s," but adding that "[ilt is
an open question as to how much the norms of civility in Congress have actually declined").
Note, however, that today's name-calling pales in comparison to the famous caning of Senator
Charles Sumner that Drew mentions and to numerous other violent episodes that she neglects.
DREW, supra note 5, at 27 ("In 1856, a House member, Preston Brooks of South Carolina, caned
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, beating him insensate, over an abolitionist speech
Sumner had given, naming names, including that of Brooks's uncle, of senators who supported
slavery."); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1366 (1992) (noting that Sumner's
speech also suggested that Senator Butler, who was Brooks's uncle, had been sleeping with his
2000]
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calling, booing, and other childish behavior that demeans both the
institution and its individual members.46 Yet Drew is guilty of similar
childishness. She has a disturbing tendency to ridicule the personal
appearance and intellect of those with whom she disagrees. For example,
she describes Mitch McConnell as "the owlish-looking, jowly senator from
Kentucky, a man of serious mien, with graying hair, a somewhat nasal
voice, and thin lips, giving him a parsonlike appearance. 47 By contrast,
those who enjoy Drew's approval are described in glowing terms. Thus she
writes that "John McCain's eyes had a certain look, which, along with his
gentle voice, drew people to him," and that he has "an aura of sensitivity
that wasn't common among politicians."48 Such reliance on physical and
slaves). For other historical examples of violence in Congress, see JAMES H. HUTSON, To MAKE
ALL LAWS: THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 41 (1989), which observes
that "[u]ntil the Civil War the floors of Congress were dangerous. Many legislators were armed-
during one House debate thirty members pulled guns-and some were prepared to carry their
differences to the local dueling grounds."
46. See DREW, supra note 5, at 38-39 (citing examples of booing, ridicule, and shoving
matches on the House floor); id. (accusing Senator Santorum of bringing "a new low to Senate
decorum-and respect for the presidency-in 1996, when he regularly came to the Senate floor
with a large poster saying 'Where's Bill?' and referring to the number of days that had passed
without Clinton's offering a budget plan"); id. (describing Senator D'Amato as "[the other
contender for worst decorum" because he brought a drawing of a pig to the Senate floor and sang
a version of "Old MacDonald Had a Farm" to protest pork barrel spending). For other instances
of incivility besides those committed by the Republican members of Congress mentioned by
Drew, see, for example, Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached; House Approves
Articles Charging Perjury, Obstruction; Mostly Partisan Vote Shifts Drama to Senate, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at Al, which reports that Representative Bob Livingston's call for President
Clinton's resignation "triggered an angry wave of catcalls on the Democratic side of the chamber,
where members began calling out, 'No! No!' Rep. Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) banged her open
palm on the table in front of her and, along with several others, began shouting, 'You resign! You
resign!' Cf. 145 CONG. REC. S12,737 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1999) (statement of Sen. Craig)
(" [T]his weekend the New York Times, in its rather typical fashion, has decided to engage in this
debate by simply calling names, suggesting that the Senate is a 'bordello' and that Mitch
McConnell is its 'madam.' Shame on you, New York Times.").
47. DREW, supra note 5, at 45. There are many other examples in the book. See, e.g., id at
143 (describing Representative John Doolittle as "appropriately named"); id. at 36 (describing
Senator Rick Santorum as "[t]oothy" and "[u]nburdened by brilliance" ); id. at 196 (stating that
Representative Tom DeLay was seen "grinning, his dark hair slicked back as usual"); id. at 113-
14 (describing the members of the Senate committee investigating campaign finance abuses,
including Don Nickles, who is "none too bright" and who asks questions "in a yapping manner,"
Robert Smith, "a big lump of a man from New Hampshire," who "was probably the dimmest
light on the Republican side," John Glenn, who "after a while became a whiny bore," and Daniel
Akaka, "often a room-emptier because of the thinness of his thought").
48. Id. at 164. Again, there are many additional examples. See, e.g., id. at 112 (describing
Senator Susan Collins as having "raven hair, blue eyes, and a porcelain complexion," and being
"a lot lovelier and livelier than she came across on the television screen"); id at 39 (describing
Representative David Skaggs as "[a) serious, thoughtful man with dark hair and dark eyes and an
almost old-fashioned courtliness"); id. at 148 (describing Senator Bob Kerrey as "the blithe
spirit .... whose large, penetrating blue eyes drew attention" and who is "an unconventional
political figure" who "didn't seem to take politics, or himself, with puffed-up seriousness"); id at
184, 196, 199 (describing the two leaders of campaign finance reform efforts in the House: Marty
Meehan, "forty-two years old, youthful and apple-cheeked, with straight, salt-and-pepper hair and
a broad Massachusetts accent"; and Chris Shays, a "gentleman" with a "gentle demeanor").
Drew further describes Shays as
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intellectual characteristics is not the most civil way to advance the needed
case for more congressional civility.
The book also provides a partisan condemnation of partisanship. Again,
there is abundant support for Drew's contention that Congress has become
more partisan in recent years.49 Even though Drew does not identify with
one political party or another, 0 the book is partisan in the broader sense that
it exalts supporters of campaign finance reform while vilifying its
opponents. Drew questions both the motives and the merits of those who
oppose campaign finance reform even as she praises the leaders of that
effort in heroic terms. She cannot imagine that opponents of campaign
finance legislation regard their fairness, constitutional, or other objections
to reform proposals as anything other than a cynical ploy to remain in
power. Her complaints against partisanship suffer from her role as a
partisan for campaign finance reform.
The incivility, partisanship, and other failings convince Drew that
"[p]erhaps the most important change is that the quality of the politicians in
Washington has declined during the past twenty-five years, and that the rate
of decline has accelerated."' Drew sees the diminishing quality of
members of Congress evidenced by their lack of experience in government,
their indulgence in ideological impulses, their overriding pursuit of their
own careers, and their failure to socialize with political opponents in a way
that would breed understanding of different points of view. 2 Drew holds
special scorn for " [t]he former House members who have entered the
Senate in recent years" -citing Trent Lott and Tom Daschle alike-
an unlikely-looking hero. A serious man with thinning blond hair who wore thick
glasses, there was a slight nerdiness in his style-a squeakiness and nervousness in his
speech, and often a worried look on his face. The nervousness stemmed in part from the
fact that he was in a difficult position as a moderate in a party that had veered sharply
right.
Id. at 181.
49. Id. at 32-38 (describing and criticizing the increased partisanship in Congress). The
empirical proof is provided in Richard E. Cohen, A Congress Divided, 32 NAT'L J. 382, 382
(2000), which notes that the House and Senate were highly polarized in 1999 and details how
.'every Democrat had an average [legislative voting] score that was to the left of the most-liberal
Republican's."
50. The book blasts President Clinton and Republican members of Congress alike.
(Democratic members of Congress escape relatively unscathed.) Congressional Republicans are
criticized for their opposition to campaign finance reform and for their overzealous efforts to
remove President Clinton from office. The book also belittles President Clinton; perhaps most
harshly, Drew remarks that "(t]he boy who wanted to grow up to be President became President
but never quite grew up." DREW, supra note 5, at 157. Drew devotes an entire chapter to her
claim that "Clinton's presidency has been a squandered opportunity." Id. at 152. She faults him
for failing to lead the effort to secure campaign finance reform, and for "la[ying] waste to two of
the office's most important elements: its mystique and its power to influence the public and the
Congress." Id. at 151-52. Her case is powerful, but because the lessons of the Clinton presidency
have been amply addressed in other forums, I will not pursue it further here.
51. Id at 19.
52. Id. at 19-22, 28-36.
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because they "are more aggressive, more partisan, less interested in issues,
and more tactical, than the average senator used to be." 53
Here Drew seems to imagine a golden era that never actually existed.
Members of Congress have long suffered from a lack of popular esteem,
especially among the elites that Drew represents. Moreover, history may
judge some of today's senators and representatives more highly than Drew
does. For example, Warren Rudman, who served as John McCain's
presidential campaign chairman, is now regarded by many as a respected
statesman, but Rudman received no such accolades when he was first
elected to the Senate in 1980.54 The passage of time may yield a better
judgment on the members of today's Congress as well. Complaints about
the capabilities of members of Congress are hardly new, which, makes
Drew's sweeping claims of a declining quality of representatives hard to
judge.
Not surprisingly, everyone suffers if those who serve in Congress are as
ill-equipped as Drew posits. Public policy loses when members of Congress
do not work with each other to seek meaningful compromises that would
yield productive legislation. The families of many members of Congress
have been strained and even broken by the atmosphere in Washington.
Most importantly, people throughout the nation have become discouraged
with American politics. Reports of public cynicism toward the government
are legion-in Drew's book, in the congressional debates over campaign
finance reform, and elsewhere.
B. Why
Drew's response to "what happened in Washington" thus contains two
discrete conclusions: Money controls what happens, and those who are
serving in Washington are not qualified to do the job. Why that has
happened-the other part of the subtitle of Drew's book-is left half-
explained. Drew writes much about the role of money in politics, but she
spends less time considering possible explanations for her conclusion that
the quality of Washington politicians has declined.
53. Il at 22.
54. Compare All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 24, 1992),
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File (statement of Deborah Anderson, New Hampshire
gubernatorial candidate) ("Most about what you remember about Warren Rudman is he's the one
who stood up and called it as he saw it when it was really critical not to he a politician but to be a
statesman."), with Michael Knight, New Hampshire Election To Settle 2 Grudge Fights Between
Old Foes, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1980, at 32 (noting that Rudman had been belittled in his Senate
race as "Waffling Warren"). Rudman remains less well regarded by many conservative
Christians, whom he has harshly criticized. See WARREN B. RUDMAN, COMBAT: TWELVE YEARS
IN THE U.S. SENATE 270 (1996).
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Drew blames the broken campaign finance system for the increased
influence of money in Washington. She is especially upset with the role of
"soft money" -money raised and spent by political parties or private
interests, as opposed to the "hard money" given to and spent by the
candidate himself or herself.5 Soft money became more attractive as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,5 which upheld
federal campaign contribution limits but struck down federal campaign
expenditure limits.5 7 Since Buckley, federal law has limited hard money
contributions to $1000 per individual and $5000 per organization," whereas
soft money contributions and expenditures have been unregulated. That is
why, for example, Microsoft could contribute $798,163 in soft money in
1999 even as Bill Gates was limited to $1000 per candidate.59 Drew thus
blames the spiraling efforts to obtain soft money for "virtually all of the
Clinton financial scandals in his 1996 election-the large contributions
from unsavory or possibly illegal sources, the heavy-handed fund-raising by
the President and the Vice President."'  Soft money, in turn, results in a
proliferation of issue advertisements that Drew regards as a pernicious
sham that substitutes the voices of special interests for the voices of the
candidates themselves. 1
All of this has happened, complains Drew, because of the Supreme
Court's invalidation of previous campaign finance reform efforts beginning
with Buckley.62 Her constitutional analysis is not the book's high point. She
never really addresses the fundamental claim that money spent on political
campaigns implicates the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment.
Instead, she devotes most of her chapter entitled "The First Amendment"
to telling the story of which groups have taken which positions on the
constitutional issue raised by campaign finance legislation.63 Drew begins
by expressing skepticism that the First Amendment argument against
campaign finance reform proposals is anything more than a tactical ploy.'
She characterizes the constitutional concerns as "specious[]" and
55. DREw, supra note 5, at 54-55, 83-84.
56. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
57. Id. at 12-59.
58. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994).
59. Common Cause, Chart IV: Top Overall Soft Money Donors to National Party
Committees, January 1, 1999 Through December 31, 1999, at http://www.commoncause.org/
soft_money/study99/chart4.htmnl (visited Apr. 30,2000).
60. DREW, supra note 5, at 59.
61. Id. at 8-9,51-52, 266.
62. Id. at 49-53.
63. Id. at 43-60.
64. See id. at 45 (observing that there are "some people ... who question whether [Senator
McConnell] truly believes his First Amendment argument, or simply finds it convenient"); id. at
57 (noting a business group's opposition to campaign finance reform and stating that "[i]f this
was done in the name of the First Amendment, the business PACs were happy to go along with
the charade").
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"bogus." 65 Her substantive critique, however, is limited to a few more
unkind remarks about Buckley, an insistence that equality and saving the
time of legislators should suffice to sustain any reforms against
constitutional attack, and a one-sided explanation of the constitutionality of
regulating soft money and issue advocacy.'
Why things besides the pernicious influence of money "went wrong in
Washington" remains unexplained. Drew does not contend that campaign
money makes members of Congress less civil, more partisan, less skilled, or
more selfish. She identifies just a few culprits for those developments, such
as the availability of information on computers and around-the-clock news
coverage that reduces the ability of legislators to engage in reflective,
thoughtful dialogue.67 Television is also to blame because it requires "that
candidates be smooth and telegenic" and thus "has just about rid us of
eccentrics, particularly in the Senate."" Apart from those passing
suggestions, the unanswered question in the book is why members of
Congress have become so nasty, partisan, and incompetent.
Several common explanations escape Drew's otherwise thorough
discussion. Drew recognizes that "there are more women and minorities in
politics,"'69 but she neglects the collateral effects of what helped achieve
those laudatory events. The increased partisanship in the House is often
attributed to redistricting decisions influenced by the Voting Rights Act that
have created more reliably liberal or conservative districts that are thereby
replacing many moderates with liberals and conservatives who enjoy safe
seats.7" The partisanship and incivility can also be traced to a broader
society that has become more divided and less civil.7 The incivility and
selfishness of members of Congress mimic the people whom they represent.
These reasons, plus the influence of campaign money, help explain why
American politics have descended to the place that Drew regards as corrupt.
Drew targets the campaign finance system and a dysfunctional
Congress as two distinct problems that result in the corruption of American
politics. Her conclusion is weak in several respects. She does not engage
65. Id. at 43 (claiming that First Amendment arguments are raised "speciously"); id. at 269
(referring to "the bogus arguments that some of the reforms under consideration ... would violate
the First Amendment's protection of free speech"); see also 145 CONG. REC. S12,811-12 (daily
ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (contending that the constitutional argument "is
fundamentally a sham issue as it is being presented by the other side").
66. See DREW, supra note 5, at 44-59.
67. Id. at28,31.
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 26.
70. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF Er AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 598-607 (1998) (describing the consequences of redistricting after the
1990 census).
71. Cf James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J.
1279, 1372 (2000) (asserting that "the United States displays a relative lack of civility, both in its
social practices and in its law," compared to French and German societies).
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the protests about the presumed cause and effect of campaign money that
were voiced in the October 1999 Senate debate, and she offers little
explanation for why Congress has become uncivil, partisan, and generally
lacking in quality. Nor does she attempt to explain whether the broken
campaign finance system and the dysfunctional Congress are related or
isolated occurrences. Most importantly, Drew does not defend her
characterization of each problem as an instance of "corruption." Perhaps
she thought that such a label followed as a matter of course once she
described what has happened to the campaign finance system and to
Congress, but the October 14 Senate debate revealed that some members of
the Senate will not accept accusations of corruption without more proof
than Drew offers.
II. CORRUPTION
Corruption has constitutional consequences. The Supreme Court has
indicated that corruption-or the appearance of corruption-is the only
constitutionally adequate basis for restrictions on campaign finance that
implicate the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.72 Yet the
October 14 debate confirms that the existence of corruption in the
American political system itself remains a point of contention. When
Senator McConnell objects that no individual Senators are corrupt, Senator
McCain insists that the entire system is corrupt, and Senator Feingold adds
that it appears to be corrupt,73 it is apparent that the notion of corruption is
different for a lot of different people. The word expands yet further when
Drew implies that the dysfunction of Congress constitutes corruption, too.
This Part examines Drew's accusation that American politics are
"corrupt." Drew devotes most of her book to the system of financing
campaigns, so I focus on that system as well. The October 14 Senate debate
and the conflicting opinions in Shrink Missouri Government PAC illustrate
the contested nature of the concept of corruption. This Part analyzes three
distinct meanings of corruption: corruption as quid pro quo agreements;
72. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 70, at 632-33 (" After Buckley, it appeared that the sole
legitimate government interest in regulating campaign finance lay in removing the temptation for
corruption."). Nonetheless, Drew is joined by other activists and commentators in pressing other
justifications for campaign finance reform. DREW, supra note 5, at 50 (contending that "[p]utting
the candidates on an even, or a relatively even, playing field" and "spar[ing] candidates from
having to spend a large percentage of their time raising money" should also suffice to justify
campaign finance regulations); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1281-84 (1994) (advancing the fundraising time argument); Symposium,
Money, Politics, and Equality, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1603 (1999) (analyzing the equalization
argument).
73. 145 CONG. REc. S12,592 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold); supra
notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
corruption as monetary influence; and corruption as inconsistency with
public opinion. The failure to achieve a consensus about which of these
views of corruption is most appropriate in the context of campaign finance
reform explains some of the difficulty that Drew and Senator McCain have
experienced in articulating their objections to the role of money in politics.
That failure also opens the door to my consideration in Part IIl of pollution
as an alternative metaphor for campaign finance concerns.
Drew's book offers the promise of a compelling brief for the case that
the campaign finance system is corrupt. The dust jacket trumpets Arianna
Huffington's promise that I would find "an incisive analysis of the
problem" and the raves of Warren Beatty that Drew "finds stuff nobody
else finds and she knows how to put it together." I have elsewhere
expressed my genuine uncertainty about whether the system is corrupt, 74 so
I eagerly read the book with the expectation that the case for corruption
would be spelled out in eloquent detail. I was disappointed. The book
nowhere defines "corruption," it neglects any consideration of the
numerous empirical studies of corruption,75 and it is even short on
anecdotes about corruption. What one finds instead are countless assertions
of corruption.
That is not to say that evidence of corruption does not exist. Rather,
those involved in the debate over campaign finance reform embrace
fundamentally different ideas of corruption. Senators McCain and
McConnell reached a stalemate on October 14 because McCain viewed the
entire process as corrupt while McConnell insisted that there was no
evidence that any individual Senator was corrupt. 6 Justices Souter and
Thomas evidenced a similar disagreement about the nature of corruption in
Shrink Missouri Government PAC.77 Or, as Professor Thomas Burke has
explained, the rhetoric about corruption in campaign finance debates refers
to three distinct kinds of corruption: (1) a quid pro quo in which a legislator
takes money in exchange for an official action; (2) the monetary influence
that campaign money exerts on a legislator's actions; and (3) the distortion
74. John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 69, 103 (2000).
75. Infra text accompanying note 94.
76. Supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
77. Compare Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2000) (Souter, J.) (noting
that Buckley "recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to
the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors"), with id.
at 924 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority "separates 'corruption' from its
quid pro quo roots and gives it a new, far-reaching (and speech-suppressing) definition, something
like '[t]he perversion of anything from an original state of purity"' (quoting 3 OxFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 974 (2d ed. 1989))). See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 851 (1985) (describing corruption as "an
'essentially contested concept,' that is, a concept containing a descriptive core on which users of
the concept can agree roughly, but so unbounded and so intertwined with controversial normative
ideas that general agreement on the features of the concept is impossible").
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of policymaking by money that causes a legislator to act inconsistently with
public opinion.78 The assertions of Drew and McCain that the campaign
finance system is corrupt presuppose either the monetary influence or the
distortion standard, not the quid pro quo standard adopted by McConnell.
A. Corruption as Quid pro Quo Agreements
Everyone agrees that a quid pro quo agreement in which a campaign
contributor funds a candidate in exchange for an agreement to take a
legislative action is corrupt. Bribery laws render such conduct a criminal
offense. The contested question is whether the label "corruption" may be
properly applied in the context of campaign finance to anything besides a
quid pro quo agreement. Senator McConnell and Justice Thomas insist that
"corruption" necessarily connotes a quid pro quo relationship.79 Justice
Souter, Senator McCain, and Drew see corruption in circumstances beyond
quid pro quo agreements."0 Because even Drew would admit that there are
few instances of quid pro quo agreements between campaign contributors
and candidates,"' her characterization of American politics as corrupt
necessarily presumes that the narrower vision of corruption is not the only
vision of corruption. 2
B. Corruption as Monetary Influence
The monetary influence standard finds corruption whenever campaign
money influences the official actions of an elected representative. Again,
everyone agrees that it is corrupt to allow money contributed to or spent in
78. Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 127, 131 (1997). The literature generally addressing corruption is surprisingly scant.
For examples of some of the excellent scholarly work that does exist, see SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999);
and John G. Peters & Susan Welch, Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and
a Theory, or If Political Corruption Is in the Mainstream of American Politics Why Is It Not in the
Mainstream of American Politics Research?, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 974 (1978).
79. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 923 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (insisting that only quid
pro quo arrangements constitute corruption); 145 CONG. REc. S12,590 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999)
(statement of Sen. McConnell) (equating corruption with bribery).
80. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 905 (Souter, J.); 145 CONG. REC. S 12,586, 512,590
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statements of Sen. McCain) (repeating that campaign money corrupts
the political system rather than individual legislators); DREW, supra note 5, at 76-77 (describing
how money can improperly influence members of Congress even if money is not actually
exchanged for a vote).
81. See DREW, supra note 5, at 137 ("Quid pro quos are usually hard to prove, even if the
circumstantial evidence is screaming."); id. at vii (explaining that her book addresses "the
expanding corruption of money in all its pervasive ways, some of them novel, and including the
corruption of the Washington culture").
82. See id. at 61 ("The culture of money .... affects the issues raised and their outcome; it
has changed employment patterns in Washington; it has transformed politics; and it has subverted
values.").
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political campaigns to dictate legislative decisions. That consensus
disappears when the effect of campaign money is considered. Drew,
Senator McCain, and other reformers view the large amounts of money
contributed and spent by particular interests as circumstantial evidence that
such money is influencing members of Congress. But most members of
Congress heatedly deny that they are influenced by campaign contributions.
As Idaho Senator Larry Craig protested, "to anyone who would suggest to
any of us that money influences, from the standpoint it is going to change
our philosophy, change our attitude or corrupt us, as some Senators have
suggested on this floor that it does--out West we call them fighting
words." 83 Drew responds that some members of Congress confess to
struggling with the implications of granting access, supporting or opposing
legislation, or taking other actions affecting their campaign contributors.'
The evidence of such corruption is almost always circumstantial. Often
corruption is seen in the mere amount of money contributed to and spent on
political campaigns by corporations, unions, political action committees
(PACs), and wealthy individuals. Senator McCain's website is more
general still, seemingly equating soft money contributions, pork barrel
spending, and a corrupt political system." Senator McCain went a step
further during the October 14 debate when he listed the amounts
contributed by various interests and the legislation that---coincidentally or
not-benefited those interests.86 The website of Common Cause, a leading
advocate of campaign finance reform, offers a host of additional instances
of suggested connections between soft money contributions and
congressional activity (or inactivity).8 7 Drew's few examples are even more
explicit when she traces how money apparently influenced the
congressional debates over the expansion of NATO,88 telecommunications
83. 145 CONG. REC. S12,739 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1999) (statement of Sen. Craig).
84. One senator admitted:
I had mixed feelings about my donors. Was I giving them the impression they
would have more access to me, or that I was now on board for their agenda, whatever it
happened to be? It was a moral dilemma all the time.
... If the system isn't corrupt, it's corrupting. It forces you into compromising
yourself.
DREW, supra note 5, at 24 (quoting Senator Dick Durbin).
85. McCain's website links pork barrel spending and soft money contributions by observing that
"[e]ach year there are several appropriations and tax bills that transfer your tax dollars to the special
interests who fund politicians [sic] insatiable appetite for soft money." McCain 2000, Stop the Pork,
at http://www.itsyourcountry.com/pork.htm (visited Apr. 30, 2000). Such efforts, McCain explains,
are part of a corrupt system even though not all pork barrel spending is triggered by soft money
contributions. John McCain, Campaign Finance Reform, Speech at Bedford, New Hampshire
(June 30, 1999), at http:/Iwww.itsyourcountry.com/speech6-30-99.htm (visited Apr. 30, 2000)
[hereinafter McCain, Campaign Finance Reform].
86. 145 CONG. REC. S12,589 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain).
87. Common Cause, 100% Special-Interest Financing, at http:I/www.commoncause.orgl
soft-money/study99/congress.htm (visited May 19, 2000).
88. DREW, supra note 5, at 67-68.
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deregulation,89 and banking reform.90 Drew is also correct in asserting that
monetary influence can be seen in the access that contributors gain to
government officials, regardless of whether money affects any actual
decisions on pending legislation."
But none of those examples proves a causal relationship between
campaign contributions and legislative decisions. Drew admits that "[q]uid
pro quos are usually hard to prove, even if the circumstantial evidence is
screaming." 92 The difficulty in proof, though, is not limited to the quid pro
quo conception of corruption relied upon by Senator McConnell. To prove
corruption in the sense of monetary influence, there must be evidence that
the money actually influenced the recipient. That is precisely the inference
that raised the ire of Senator Craig last October.93 Moreover, the empirical
studies have yielded conflicting results concerning the influence, if any, of
campaign contributions on legislators.94
It is surprisingly difficult to identify specific campaign contributions
that distorted public policy. Consider two of the congressional
appropriations listed on Senator McCain's website that became the center
of debate on October 14. As part of the emergency appropriations to fund
military operations in Kosovo in May 1999, Congress included $2.2 million
for sewer infrastructure projects associated with 2002 Winter Olympics in
Salt Lake City, and it exempted the Crown Jewel Mine in Washington from
a new administrative ruling prohibiting the disposal of mining wastes on
federal lands surrounding the mine. McCain listed both provisions among
dozens of provisions that he characterized as pork barrel spending.9
Elsewhere on his website, McCain linked pork barrel spending to soft
money contributions and corruption, though he also posted a disclaimer that
not all listed provisions were necessarily corrupt.9" During the October 14
Senate debate, Utah's Senator Robert Bennett and Washington's Senator
Slade Gorton defended the provisions and objected to the insinuation that
89. Id. at 79-81.
90. Id. at 81-82.
91. Id. at 76-77, 127.
92. Id at 137.
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
94. See Nagle, supra note 74, at 101 n.101 (citing numerous studies reaching contradictory
conclusions regarding the effect of campaign contributions on legislative decisions).
95. McCain 2000, The Pork List Goes On, at http://www.itsyourcountry.conporklist.htm
(visited Apr. 30, 2000). McCain leveled the same charge when the Senate agreed to include those
provisions in the emergency appropriations bill. 145 CONG. REC. S5647-48 (daily ed. May 20,
1999) (statement of Sen. McCain).
96. McCain, Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 85 (admitting that not all pork barrel
spending is motivated by special interest campaign contributions); McCain 2000, The Problem Is
Special Interests, at http://www.itsyourcountry.com/problem.htm (visited Apr. 30, 2000)
(describing cases of "special interests buying special favor in Washington").
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they were corrupt.97 Senator McCain responded that he objected to both
provisions because of the abbreviated process that produced them, but he
did not link either provision to any campaign contributions.9" The lesson is
that the two provisions might have been bad public policy, but it is unlikely
that Senators Bennett and Gorton pushed them to pander to campaign
contributors.'
Yet the public is convinced of the monetary influence resulting from
campaign contributions. The best test of the assumption that extraordinarily
large contributions influence the actions of the legislators who receive the
money would be provided by a proposal that I have articulated elsewhere:
to eliminate all restrictions on the amount of money that can be contributed
to candidates for the legislature, but to require members of the legislature to
recuse themselves from any involvement in any matters affecting a
campaign contributor."°° If contributions dried up once legislators could no
longer act on behalf of a contributor, that would suggest that the purpose of
contributions was to influence the legislator all along. But if contributions
continued apace, then the hypothesis that contributions are designed to
influence a legislator would be hard to sustain.
Absent such an empirical test, the debate about the purpose of
campaign contributions will persist. Yet the popular assumption about the
purpose of campaign contributions cannot be discounted simply because of
the lack of definitive proof. Campaign money, like the role of race in
reapportionment, 1 ' is an area where appearances do matter. The
97. 145 CONG. REC. S12,587-89 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Bennett); id. at
S 12,590-91 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
98. Id. at S12,589 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain) (asserting that
Senator Bennett "engaged in a continuous practice of violating the rules of the Senate, which
require authorization and then appropriation, for several years now"); id. at S12,592 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain) (insisting that "[n]owhere should it be interpreted that
every single one of those pork barrel projects are as a result of soft money").
99. The two provisions contained in the emergency appropriations for Kosovo are not
isolated examples of the difficulty of tying specific campaign money to specific legislative
actions. Senator MeCain's October 14 speech linked spending by several industries to certain
congressional actions, see 145 CONG. REC. S12,589 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen.
McCain), but a subsequent report denied that there was any such connection, see Burt Solomon,
Forever Unclean, 32 NAT'L J. 858, 859 (2000) ("Neutral observers pooh-pooh accusations that
campaign donations have proved decisive in congressional action on, among other things,
tobacco, bankruptcy law, gambling, financial services deregulation, ethanol subsidies, and a
patients' bill of rights."). Or consider the example that Time magazine chose for its February 7,
2000, cover story on the influence of big money in politics. The Time story maintained that
campaign contributions from the owner of Chiquita bananas prompted the Clinton Administration
to launch a trade war to open European markets for Chiquita. Donald L. Barlett & James B.
Steele, How To Become a Top Banana, TIME, Feb. 7, 2000, at 42. Another report soon challenged
Time's account of the events, suggesting that Time Warner's own campaign contributions offered
a better example of the use of money to affect a policy decision. John Maggs, Bananas, Nuance,
and Time, 32 NAT'L J. 634, 635 (2000).
100. Nagle, supra note 74, at 81-85 (describing the proposal).
101. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (" [W]e believe that reapportionment is one
area in which appearances do matter.").
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circumstantial evidence of monetary influence of campaign money is not as
persuasive as the kind of direct evidence that would satisfy Senator
McConnell, but circumstantial evidence does suffice to prove most
propositions in court. Indeed, public perceptions about the influence of
campaign contributions are better described in terms of reflecting a
judgment about the persuasiveness of the circumstantial evidence of
corruption (as conceived as monetary influence), rather than providing an
independent justification for regulation affecting First Amendment
interests. The appearance of corruption should not justify government
regulation if that appearance is actually a misperception. The response to a
misperception of corruption should be to correct that misimpression, not to
indulge it. But if the public perception is viewed as the people's judgment
about the circumstantial evidence of corruption, and if the legislative
judgment is seen as reflecting the popular perception, then deference to that
judgment can be appropriate.
The Court has stumbled toward this conclusion, though not in so many
words. The majority in Shrink Missouri Government PAC disdained any
effort to explain the precision with which corruption must be proved in
order to support regulation of campaign contributions. °2 The meager
evidence of corruption cited by the Court consisted of a handful of local
newspaper stories containing unproven allegations of a nexus between
specific contributions and legislative acts, and reports of polls showing that
the public viewed contributions as influencing their elected representatives
in Jefferson City.0 3 The Court then dismissed the contrary studies
indicating that no monetary influence had occurred as unproven and
unlikely to have swayed popular opinion in any event."° Perhaps most
importantly, the Court was willing to defer to the judgment of the
legislature that contributions exerted monetary influence. 1°5 The implicit
message that emerges from the opinion is that if the legislature or the
people believes that corruption exists, then that is good enough for the
Court.
Of course, such reliance upon the legislature's view of the monetary
influence of corruption is a double-edged sword. Legislators will not easily
admit that they are corrupted by the campaign contributions that they
102. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 907-08 (2000).
103. Id.; cf. Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
456-58 (1st Cir. 2000) (relying upon a similar collection of polls, newspaper clippings, and
legislative anecdotes to sustain the corruption rationale of Maine's campaign finance statute).
104. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 908.
105. The majority deferred implicitly by declining to impose a specific evidentiary burden
and accepting the minimal evidence of corruption proffered by the state (including evidence that
was not before the legislature). Id. at 906-08. Justice Breyer was more explicit that the Court
should defer to the legislature's "political judgment that unlimited spending threatens the integrity
of the electoral process," although he was unwilling to defer to the legislature's choice of
remedies as well. Id. at 913 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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receive. Drew responds that contributions make good legislators do bad
things." 6 Many members of Congress agree with her, but many other
members echo Senator Craig's rejection of that assessment. As the October
14 debate shows, the disagreement centers as much on the implications of
the word "corruption" as it does on any empirical or anecdotal evidence of
the monetary influence of campaign contributions. Therein lies the most
telling shortcoming of viewing corruption according to the monetary
influence standard. Any effort to enact new federal regulations of campaign
contributions will fail so long as enough members of Congress remain
unconvinced that such contributions influence them to such an extent that
they may be regarded as corruption.
C. Corruption as Inconsistency with Public Opinion
The distortion standard sees corruption when money affects the
policymaking process by causing a legislator to act inconsistently with
public opinion. As Professor Burke explains, "[t]he ideal behind this
standard is that the decisions of officeholders should closely reflect the
views of the public. Campaign contributions are corrupting to the extent
that they do not reflect the balance of public opinion and thus distort
policymaking through their influence on elections." 07 Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce,' the decision most often cited in support of
this view, refers to corruption as "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas." "09 Burke describes Austin as
indicating that "corruption is no longer tied to the conduct of the
officeholder, but instead concerns the power of the corporate spender in the
political marketplace." "o
The distortion standard presupposes a certain model of representation,
to wit, that legislators should act in the manner desired by a majority of
their constituents. But that is just one position in the longstanding debate
about the appropriate role for a legislator in a representative democracy.
The contrary view, as quoted by Drew, is reflected by Edmund Burke's
classic assertion that a legislator "'is in Parliament to support his opinion of
the public good and does not form his opinion in order to get into
106. DREw, supra note 5, at 61; see also 145 CONG. REC. S12,586 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999)
(statement of Sen. McCain) (" [T]his system makes good people do bad things.").
107. Burke, supra note 78, at 131.
108. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
109. Id. at 660.
110. Burke, supra note 78, at 135.
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Parliament, or to continue in it.'"' " Drew seems to endorse that model of
representation even as she worries that today's politicians find that view
"passe, and even a bit weird," ' and she complains that legislators today
implicitly reject it when they "reflect[] the momentary mood of the
public." 113 The dilemma this creates for Drew is that the Burkean theory of
representation might compel, rather than just tolerate, less regulation of
campaign contributions and spending. As Justice Kennedy explained after
describing the Burkean ideal in Shrink Missouri Government PAC:
Whether our officeholders can discharge their duties in a proper
way when they are beholden to certain interests both for reelection
and campaign support is, I should think, of constant concern not
alone to citizens but to conscientious officeholders themselves.
There are no easy answers, but the Constitution relies on one: open,
robust, honest, unfettered speech that the voters can examine and
assess in an ever-changing and more complex environment. 114
In any event, Drew's endorsement of the Burkean tradition precludes her
from characterizing any legislative decision contrary to the popular
majority as corrupt.
Campaign contributions and expenditures can satisfy any of these three
theories of corruption. But few observers believe that there is a quid pro
quo relationship involved in most campaign contributions. The extent to
which contributions exert a monetary influence is a point of strong
contention, and the appropriate model of representation continues to be a
source of debate as well. The corruption label that Drew attaches to the
existing system of financing political campaigns thus suffers from two
11. DREW, supra note 5, at 29 (quoting Burke). Senator Graham echoed the reference to
Burke in his October 1999 speech supporting campaign finance reform. 145 CONG. REC. S 12,824
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Sen. Graham).
112. DREW, supra note 5, at 29.
113. Id. More graphically, she observes that "[pleople tend to think that the politicians in
Washington are 'out of touch' with their constituents, but if they were any more in touch their ears
would never leave the ground." Id. at 29; see also id. at 25 ("The level of courage in the face of
these challenges to vote with popular sentiment has dropped."). Drew is especially approving of
campaign finance reformers who do the right thing regardless of the political consequences. Id. at
181 (applauding Representative Shays for supporting campaign finance reform despite opposition
from fellow Republicans). She does not, however, extend the same courtesy to those who oppose
campaign finance reform. If the popular support for campaign finance reform is as great as Drew
believes, then a member of Congress who opposes such reforms might be viewed as following in
the Burkean tradition of heeding personal convictions rather than popular desires. Drew does not
even entertain that possibility, instead ascribing selfish political motives to anyone who votes
against campaign finance reform. Id. at 46 (suggesting that Republicans oppose campaign finance
reform because they fear "the power of the 'liberal media"'). Likewise, when Drew devotes a
lengthy chapter to the impeachment of President Clinton, she recognizes that many Republicans
supported impeachment in the face of public opposition, but again she is unwilling to believe that
their motivation was principled instead of selfish or vengeful. Id. at 211-30.
114. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 916 (2000) (Kennedy, ., dissenting).
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problems: which theory of corruption is appropriate, and what evidence
exists to satisfy that theory. The Supreme Court avoided both of those
issues in Shrink Missouri Government PAC by its apparent disinterest in
both the precise theory of corruption and the actual evidence supporting
that theory. But the allegation of corruption must also persuade the
legislators--or people-who consider campaign finance reforms in the first
instance, and the results have fallen far short of the desires of Drew and
other reformers. The October 14 debate confirms that part of the problem is
the corruption metaphor itself. It touches a raw nerve, and it has not yielded
the kind of reform that Drew, Senator McCain, and others want. So perhaps
a new image of the problem would help.
Il. POLLUTION
Pollution provides an alternative metaphor for the campaign finance
problems cited by Drew, Senator McCain, and others. The idea that
campaign contributions and spending pollute the political system, rather
than corrupt it, can be attributed to D.C. Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright. His
1982 article Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality? offered the possibility of exploring an
alternative, potentially more helpful metaphor for the concerns about
campaign finance.11 Judge Wright's article contains a few references to
"[t]he corrosive effect of money on the political process," 116 an image that
Drew employs as well.117 But Wright fails to develop fully the meaning of
his suggestion that politics are polluted, not corrupted.
The pollution metaphor has been deployed in the campaign finance
debate on a handful of occasions since then. Former Senator Howard
Metzenbaum supported campaign finance reform because "[s]pecial
interests are polluting our politics like never before."'"' A 1998 New
115. Wright, supra note 17.
116. Id. at 609; see also id. at 621, 645 (referring to the "corrosive influence of money" on
the political process).
117. DREW, supra note 5, at 267 (stating that "[r]eform of our campaign finance system to
get at the worst, most corrosive problem in our political system isn't a lost cause").
118. Howard M. Metzenbaum, The Needfor Change Is Now Clearer Than Ever, ROLL CALL,
July 26, 1999, 1999 WL 14666093. Others have recently described campaign finance as a
pollution problem. E.g., John W. Ashenfelter, Editorial, Gambling Hurts Families and Pollutes
Our Politics, THE PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IIl.), July 17, 1999, at A14 (criticizing the
gambling industry's campaign contributions for buying influence in the Illinois government);
Editorial, The Pollution of Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1999, at A16 (complaining that
Congress had failed "to eliminate notoriously corrosive soft money contributions"); Walter
Shapiro, Seeking Substance in Caucus Clamor, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2000, at 4A (referring to
"the torrents of unregulated campaign cash that pollute politics"). Other references see pollution
in politics apart from campaign finance issues. E.g., William Safire, For a "Citizen's Privilege,"
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at A27 ("Professions of purity pollute our politics."); Hardball with
Chris Matthews (CNBC television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1999), available at LEXIS, News Library,
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Mexico congressional race featured charges by Democratic candidate Phil
Maloof that special interest money "pollutes politics," while his incumbent
Republican opponent Heather Wilson insisted that the real problem was the
three million dollars of his own money that Maloof spent on the
campaign." 9 Al Gore has deplored issue ads that "pollut[e] the public
airwaves," 12 and Hillary Rodham Clinton's campaign spokesman called on
Rudolph Giuliani's Senate campaign to return a "toxic contribution" from
a leading environmental polluter.' A proposed "Campaign Pollution
Control Act" would prevent negative advertising by candidates receiving
public financing in Rhode Island elections.'22
The state "clean election" laws further pursue this image. The people
of Arizona, Maine, and Massachusetts have enacted statutes entitled "clean
election" laws through ballot initiatives, the Vermont legislature adopted its
own such law, and similar proposals are being considered in many other
states."n The stated purpose of such statutes is "to create a clean elections
system that will improve the integrity of ... state government by
diminishing the influence of special-interest money, will encourage citizen
participation in the political process, and will promote freedom of
Transcripts File (interview with Rich Bond, former chair of the Republican National Committee,
who describes Pat Buchanan as "a superfund site. He pollutes politics").
119. Candidates Field Questions on School Violence and Minimum Wage, ALBUQUERQUE
TRIB., June 16, 1998, at A7 (quoting Maloof's statement in a debate that "I've never taken a
penny of special-interest PAC money. I think it pollutes politics"); John J. Lumpkin, Maloof
Spends Way into Record Book, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 2, 1998, at Al ("The $3.1 million of his
own money that Phil Maloof has poured into a so-far unsuccessful congressional campaign
appears to have set a national record for a Democrat seeking a U.S. House seat."); Barry Massey,
N.M. Race Reflects National Debate over PACs, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., June 22, 1998, at A6
(noting that "Maloof describes his personal wealth as a clean source of campaign cash," while
"Wilson portrays Maloof as trying to buy his way into Congress"). Wilson won the election with
45% of the vote, despite being outspent by Maloof, in part because a Green Party candidate who
spent less than $10,000 won 15% of the vote. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN PoLmcs 2000, at 1074-75 (1999).
120. Gore Lashes Out at 'Phony' Critics; Medicare-Plan Foes Pollute TV, He Says, CHI.
TRIB., July 6, 2000, at 18 (reporting that Gore accused the Citizens for Better Medicare of
"polluting the public airwaves with special-interest TV ads designed to deceive the American
people about a prescription drug benefit").
121. Lynne Duke, Hillary Clinton Returns Campaign Donation, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2000,
at A4 (quoting Howard Wolfson, Clinton's campaign spokesman).
122. R.I. 99-S0764 (Jan. Sess. 1999), available at http:/lwww.rilin.state.ri.usibilltext99/
senatetext99/s0764.htm (visited Apr. 30, 2000); see also Bruce Landis & Jonathan Saltzman,
Lawmakers Ponder Halting Money for "Stupid" Attack Ads; A Proposal To End "Campaign
Pollution" Is Among a Flood of Bills Taken Up by Committees in Both Chambers as Deadlines
Loom, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 8, 1999, at lB (noting that the sponsor of the bill admitted that
it was controversial but "a law isn't unconstitutional until a court rules that it is").
123. See Citizens Clean Elections Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to -961 (West
Supp. 1999); Maine Clean Election Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A §§ 1121-1128 (West
Supp. 1999); Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A (West Supp.
2000); Vermont Campaign Finance Option, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2851-2856 (Supp. 1999).
For a summary of the effort to enact clean elections laws, see Public Campaign, Clean Money
Campaign Reform, http://www.publiccampaign.org/cleanmoney.html (visited Apr. 7, 2000).
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speech." 124 The image of clean elections has become so powerful that the
threat of being labeled "unclean" has prompted candidates to object to the
government imposing that label. 12' The resonance of that image supports a
closer examination of the lessons of the pollution metaphor for campaign
finance.
A. Pollution Versus Corruption
The contrast between the colloquial understandings of pollution and
corruption is telling. The terms are synonymous insofar as they presuppose
a baseline condition that is unpolluted and uncorrupted. They are also
similar in their implication that something has gone wrong that has altered
that condition for the worse. The terms differ, though, concerning the cause
of that harmful change. The dictionary definitions of "pollute" and
"pollution" suggest an outside agent that renders something impure.126 The
dictionary definitions of "corrupt" are more general. Sometimes "corrupt"
refers to the same concept of the harmful work of an outside agent, but in
other uses the term refers to a harm that occurs naturally, while most
broadly it includes any "change from good to bad." 127 Another distinction
between the terms involves the unique connotation of pollution as a
byproduct that produces unintended (though foreseeable) results.
Corruption is also more likely than pollution to connote wrongdoing by
specific individuals.
These distinctions support the description of campaign funds as
polluting rather than corrupting. The pollution metaphor better captures
Drew's description of the unseen, incremental, yet real impairment that
money works on the political and legislative system. The political
environment that Drew portrays is as polluted as the air in Bangkok or the
water in Nigeria. Those who must live in such a political environment
124. ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940(A) (West Supp. 1999).
125. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
470 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that the state agency will not label candidates but that private
interests are free to characterize candidates as clean or unclean).
126. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "pollution," in part,
as "[clontamination of the environment by a variety of sources including but not limited to
hazardous substances, organic wastes and toxic chemicals"); 12 THE OXFoRD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 42-43 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "pollute," in part, as "[t]o render ceremonially or
morally impure; to impair, violate, or destroy the purity or sanctity of; to profane, desecrate; to
sully, corrupt," and defining "pollution," in part, as "[t]he presence in the environment, or the
introduction into it, of products of human activity which have harmful or objectionable effects").
127. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (1986) (defining
"corrupt"); see also, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 348 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "corruption"
as " [diepravity, perversion or taint; an impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle; esp., the
impairment of a public official's duties by bribery"); 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 973
(2d ed. 1989) (defining "corruption" as "[t]he destruction or spoiling of anything, esp. by
disintegration or by decompostion with its attendant unwholesomeness; and loathsomeness;
putrefaction" ).
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suffer the same kinds of slow yet inexorable injuries as those individuals
who breathe dirty air and drink contaminated water day after day after day.
Likewise, even if campaign contributions and spending are not designed to
sway legislative decisions, such money may still be regarded as polluting if
it has the unintended harmful byproduct of influencing legislative decisions.
The pollution metaphor also avoids the insinuation that certain politicians
are corrupt, the charge that Senator McConnell found particularly
objectionable during the October 14 debate.'28
That is not to say that the pollution metaphor captures all of the
subtleties of the debate about campaign finance or that the corruption
metaphor is altogether misplaced. The description of campaign money as
polluting faces the same questions about the motivation and effect of
campaign contributions that confront the image of corruption, though
perhaps from a slightly more accessible perspective. Conversely, corruption
correctly describes those instances when contributors or candidates know
that money will yield expected results. The label of corruption may also be
used correctly in other contexts involving campaign funding, but not in the
eyes of those like Senator Craig who deny the premise and those like
Senator McConnell and Justice Thomas who cling to a more precise
understanding of corruption. The pollution metaphor may be capable of
performing the same work as the metaphor of corruption in the context of
campaign finance reform, but without the same baggage. Perhaps most
intriguingly, the description of campaign money as polluting presents
strikingly different consequences for the elimination of such pollution
depending upon what kind of pollution one has in mind.
B. Campaign Finance as Environmental Pollution
Consider how the law addresses environmental pollution. First, it
identifies the pollution. The Clean Water Act (CWA), for example, defines
"pollutant" by listing fifteen specific materials and three general types of
wastes.1 29 As Professor William Rodgers observes, "[t]his laundry list of
'bads' endorses an understanding of a pollutant as a 'resource out of
place.'"" 30 Other statutes define pollution in more general terms that simply
128. See 145 CONG. REC. S12,586 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
("[H]ow can it be corruption if no one is corrupt? That is like saying the gang is corrupt but none
of the gangsters are.").
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994) (defining "pollutant" as "dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological
materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into the water").
130. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 300 (2d ed. 1994).
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refer to anything that has a harmful effect on the air or the water.' 31
Pollution is sometimes defined to exist any time a specified agent is
introduced into the air or water, but other statutes define pollution as
containing a threshold amount. 32 Next, the law explains what can be
polluted. Again, the CWA refers to "waters of the United States." 13 Other
statutes identify what is polluted as the air, the water, the natural
environment, or other media."3 The polluters, in turn, include any
individual, corporation, or other party that discharges a pollutant into waters
of the United States. 35
Now transfer that understanding to campaign contributions and
expenditures. The threshold difficulty is establishing that there is a
pollutant. The typical description of the problems facing the existing
campaign finance system suggests that money-especially soft money-is
the pollutant that is introduced into the political environment. Drew, for
example, argues that "[t]he culture of money dominates Washington as
never before," and she refers to "the pervasive role" played by "political
money." 136 The implication is that money spent on political campaigns
permeates the political environment and affects it for the worse. In other
words, such money pollutes the system.
This rationale faces a number of objections. Unlike dioxin or PCBs,
money is not harmful in all times and in all places. Few observers would
characterize the economic marketplace as polluted by money even though
money plays a more substantial role in that environment than in the political
marketplace. Even within the political marketplace, money appears in a
variety of different places-such as lobbying by private interests and
appropriations by legislators-that pose problems of their own but which
131. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-4-502(22) (West 1999) (defining "pollution" or
"pollute" as "the condition of water resulting from the introduction therein of substances of a
kind and in quantities rendering it detrimental or immediately or potentially dangerous to the
public health, or unfit for public or commercial use"); KY. REV. STAT. § 224A.0 11(22) (Michie
1998) (defining "pollution" as "the placing of any noxious or deleterious substances... in any
waters of the state or affecting the properties of any waters of the state in a manner which renders
the waters harmful or inimical to the public health or to animal or aquatic life, or to the use,
present or future, of these waters for domestic water supply, industrial or agricultural purposes, or
recreational purposes").
132. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 131420) (West 2000) (defining "pollution" as
the introduction into groundwaters of pesticides "above a level, with an adequate margin of
safety, that does not cause adverse health effects").
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (stating that the "navigable waters" within the scope of the CWA
are "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas").
134. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (1994) (defining "air pollutant"
as various materials that enter "the ambient air"); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 24-0107(8)
(Michie, WESTLAW through 1999) (defining "pollution" as "the presence in the environment"
of various harmful contaminants).
135. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (regulating "the discharge of any pollutant by any
person").
136. DREW, supra note 5, at 61; see also text accompanying notes 118-120 (citing instances
of campaign contributions and spending being termed "pollution").
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fall outside the scope of what Drew condemns as corrupt. The
consequences of targeting money contributed to or spent on political
campaigns as pollution become more troubling when it is remembered that
such money is spent on speech.
Even if campaign money can be characterized as pollution, that does
not mean that all such money constitutes pollution. Drew does not believe
that all campaign contributions or spending are problematic, suggesting
instead that money below a certain amount does not present any problem." 7
This refusal to target all campaign money fits nicely within those
environmental statutes that indicate that pollution does not exist until a
threshold amount of the contaminant is introduced into the water or the
air. 3 ' In both instances the label "pollution" is applied only if the agent of
concern is capable of causing harm at a particular level.
The challenge, then, is to identify how much and what kind of
campaign money the political environment can tolerate without suffering
harm. So viewed, the problem is not money itself, but the influence that
money has on political campaigns and the legislative process.'39 And
whether or not campaign contributions or campaign spending have such an
influence echoes the questions raised by the monetary influence theory of
corruption."4 The investigation into the effect that campaign money has on
legislators and the legislative process will also guide the inquiry into
whether such money is a pollutant or not.
But the pollution metaphor adds several nuances to the inquiry into the
effect of campaign money. First, the need to ascertain the baseline
condition of the natural environment in order to know when it becomes
polluted suggests the need for an agreement about a properly functioning
campaign and legislative process prior to any determination that money has
adversely affected that process. Second, campaign money cannot be
regarded as a pollutant if the same effects-for example, the same
legislative decisions or the same electoral results-would have occurred
anyway. Third, the concept of pollution leads toward consideration of the
effect of campaign money on the political environment as a whole instead
of its effect on specific legislators and their decisions. Fourth, the regulation
of environmental pollution often favors prophylactic measures, as opposed
to individualized determinations of harm. For example, sand appears on the
CWA's list of materials described as pollutants when it is discharged into
the water even though a body of water is not always harmed when sand is
137. id. at 269 (encouraging campaign finance reformers to "overcome their resistance to
raising the limit on individual contributions").
138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
139. See Nagle, supra note 74, at 71 (arguing that campaign finance reform should take into
account the influence of campaign money, rather than the mere existence of such money).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 83-106.
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dumped into it.'4' Finally, viewing campaign finance through the lens of
pollution encourages consideration of whether campaign money is pollution
because it is in the wrong place, because there is too much of it, or both.
Each of these distinctions raises new questions that should be addressed
when evaluating campaign finance reforms.
The next aspect of the analogy between environmental pollution and
campaign money considers what is being polluted. The political, electoral,
and legislative environments can all be seen as polluted by campaign
money. The legislative process is polluted when campaign contributions
and spending affect the policy decisions made by members of Congress.
Political campaigns are polluted when money distorts the electoral process.
The title of Drew's book contends that what has been "corrupted" is
"American politics," and other descriptions of the campaign finance
problem agree that the harm is suffered by the political system. 42
The last view-that the political system is the injured party-responds
to the difficulty that Senator McCain had last October when Senator
McConnell asked which senators were corrupted. Individuals are often
characterized as corrupt; they are rarely described as polluted. The things
that are described as polluted-the air, the water-are more general.
Another use of the term "pollution" is even more helpful. The House report
accompanying the Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991 refers to
workplaces polluted by discrimination. 43 Note that it is the workplace that
is polluted, not individual employees. Or to offer one more illustration, it is
more common to describe a forest as polluted than the trees.
To say that the political system is polluted avoids the implication that
particular representatives are polluted. It also avoids the connotation of
corruption that suggests that no corruption can be tolerated. By contrast, the
law tolerates some environmental pollution. The law intervenes to regulate
or prohibit pollution only when the amount of a particular type of pollutant
has harmful effects. Under this view, campaign contributions and spending
would be permissible up to the point where they begin to produce harmful
effects, including but not limited to corruption. Indeed, the pollution
metaphor permits consideration of other justifications for campaign finance
regulation, such as encouraging all interests to have an equal voice in the
141. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994) (including "sand" within the definition of "pollutant").
142. See 145 CONG. REC. S12,600 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(stating that "[u]nlimited amounts of money given to political campaigns have impaired our
integrity as political parties and as a legislative institution"); 144 CONG. REc. H6944 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1998) (statement of Rep. Roukema) (noting that "unions, corporations, and wealthy
individuals pumped over $260 million of soft money into the political environment" during the
previous election cycle).
143. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 47 (1991) (quoting a statement by the former counsel of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development that "[i]t is in the interest of American
society as a whole to assure that equality of opportunity in the workplace is not polluted by
unlawful discrimination").
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political process. Environmental pollution exists when there is too much of
one substance relative to the amount of another substance. For example, a
certain amount of chlorine is not harmful when it is contained in a large
body of water, but it is harmful when it is contained in a small cup of water.
Likewise, a $10,000 contribution may not be harmful in the context of a
presidential campaign when thousands of other individuals and
organizations make similar contributions, but its effect would be much
more dramatic in a municipal election where the typical amount spent in the
entire campaign is less than that.
Also, the appearance of pollution often justifies legal regulation. To be
sure, unsubstantiated fears of pollution fail to support even a private
nuisance action against an alleged polluter.' But several environmental
regulations target pollution simply because it is unsightly, even if no health
or other harms exist. The Clean Air Act, for example, forbids the
introduction of pollution into areas like the Grand Canyon where the air is
crystal clear. 45 Likewise, the CWA prohibits the degradation of bodies of
water even if they could tolerate pollution and still satisfy the health
standards.'" Local efforts to apply zoning laws to protect aesthetic interests
have also become acceptable to the courts in most jurisdictions.'47 These
legal rules support the Court's treatment of the appearance of improper
influence of campaign money as a distinct basis for the regulation of
campaign contributions.
The pollution of campaign contributions differs from environmental
pollution in one important respect. Environmental pollution occurs either as
a byproduct (such as emissions from a factory) or from an accident (such as
an oil spill), or from knowing wrongdoing (such as a midnight dumper).
The polluting effect of campaign contributions-if it exists-is intentional
but not knowingly wrongful.'48 That depends, of course, on the contested
question of the purpose of such contributions: to influence future legislative
decisions or to reward legislators and candidates for decisions already
made. If the purpose is to influence decisions, then the result is both
intended and understandably characterized as pollution. If contributions are
144. See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992).
145. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491-7492 (1994); Assessment of Visibility Impairment at the Grand
Canyon National Park: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,458 (1999)
(describing the EPA's plans for complying with the Clean Air Act's duty to protect the visibility
of areas like the Grand Canyon).
146. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B); PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
705 (1994) (describing the CWA's antidegradation provision).
147. See JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE INSTrrUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 919-21 (1998) (explaining the willingness of the
state courts to allow zoning for aesthetic purposes).
148. See The Pollution of Politics, supra note 118 (distinguishing environmental pollution
from the pollution of politics because "[w]ith money in politics ... it is the intended effect that is
polluting").
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reactive instead, then the result is neither intended nor characterized as
pollution. In other words, if campaign contributions are fairly regarded as
pollution, then their intentional nature distinguishes them from
environmental pollution.
If money is the pollutant and the political or legislative system is what
is polluted, then the polluters are those who contribute to political
campaigns. Just as environmental statutes do not distinguish among
factories or mines or individuals that pollute the air or the water, the image
of pollution in the campaign context includes corporations, PACs, unions,
nonprofit organizations, and individuals alike. Remember, though, that the
choice of the appropriate definition of "pollutant" will determine whether
all campaign contributors are regarded as polluters, or only those who
contribute more than a certain amount of money.
C. Remedies for Environmental Pollution and Campaign Finance
Once the pollution and the polluters are identified, the question
becomes how to reduce or eliminate the pollution. Removing the pollution
of campaign contributions and spending can be accomplished in a similar
manner as the removal of other kinds of environmental pollution. One
common remedy for environmental pollution suggests that the regulation of
campaign finance is unnecessary. As Judge Deanell Reece Tacha recently
observed in the course of invalidating an FEC limit on political party
spending, "the old rule of sanitary engineers applies here: the solution to
pollution is dilution." 49 The idea, as described above, is that the harmful
effect of a substance disappears if the substance is mixed into a sufficiently
large environment. This would appear to be the case with campaign
finance: The effect of a $1000 contribution diminishes when it is simply
one of thousands received by a candidate, and larger contributions to
political parties are likewise diluted by many similar contributions. The
dilution analogy, however, cannot be pressed too far. According to
Professor Rodgers, "[p]ollution dilution is a control strategy held in low
esteem" in contemporary environmental law, which favors the removal of
pollution instead. 5 But much of the demand to remove environmental
149. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000)
(citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Committee for Party Renewal, Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489)); see Richard Briffault, The Political Parties
and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 620,647 (2000).
150. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 16 (1986).
Rodgers acknowledges, however, that dilution might satisfy the CWA's water quality standards.
Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977)). Contra Mark C. Van Putten &
Bradley D. Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 888 (1986)
(arguing that Congress intended "to eliminate dilution in national waters as an acceptable
pollution control solution").
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pollution comes from a moral objection to the very existence of pollution in
the air or the water, whereas it is more difficult to sustain an objection
against the presence of any money in political campaigns. Instead, it is a
more limited objection to dilution as a remedy for environmental pollution
that is most relevant here. Dilution does not remedy environmental
pollution---especially water pollution-if the substance is especially toxic
or if the substance concentrates in certain places rather than spreading
out.' Campaign money is not especially toxic, but the concentration of
such money in the hands of certain legislators, candidates, and parties is
precisely the problem that much campaign finance legislation is designed to
address.
The preferred techniques for regulating environmental pollution could
be extended to respond to the concerns about the polluting effect of money
in political campaigns as well. Federal environmental statutes like the CWA
and the Clean Air Act rely upon a complicated regulatory scheme that
employs technological, prohibitory, and other devices. The CWA, for
example, forbids anyone without a permit from introducing any pollution
from a point source into a water of the United States.'52 The principal
statutory system for determining when a permit will be issued begins with
an understanding of how much of each pollutant can be tolerated until an
injury occurs, then mandates a specified type of technology that each
industry must employ to avoid such pollution."3 Variances are extended
to those polluters who can show that their circumstances were not
contemplated by the process of establishing the general limits.' That
system is supplemented by provisions authorizing the imposition of
151. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution- The Kepone Incident
and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 662 n. 1 (1995) (agreeing that
"[w]idespread diffusion can indeed lessen environmental effects," but explaining that "many
pollutants do not thin out evenly through the environment, but rather collect in nodes ... where
their effects are reconcentrated rather than dispersed").
152. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994) (providing that "the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful" except when in compliance with a permit or other statutory exception).
By contrast, pollution that reaches the water from farms, roads, and other nonpoint sources is
largely exempt from federal regulation, and addressed instead through state programs that feature
voluntary incentives. See, e.g., Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act
Section 401, 23 Ecowo.y L.Q. 201, 283 (1996). Campaign finance could be viewed as an
instance of nonpoint source pollution because there are so many scattered individuals and
organizations who contribute or spend money on political campaigns. Such money, though, is
difficult to characterize as polluting unless one adheres to an absolutist view that the political
environment cannot tolerate any money. The better view is that if campaign finance involves
pollution, then it presents an instance of pollution from point sources that can be defined, and if
desirable, controlled.
153. See generally RODGERS, supra note 130, at 361-74 (describing the permit system
established by the CWA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System).
154. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (upholding the EPA's issuance
of variances to polluters that demonstrate that they are fundamentally different from other
polluters subject to the general CWA regulation).
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additional permit restrictions to assure a certain level of water quality when
the technological restrictions prove inadequate.155
The CWA analogy suggests that the pollution caused by "excessive"
campaign contributions and expenditures can be remedied by determining
how much money the system can tolerate and then prohibiting any
additional money absent a permit based both on what can be accomplished
and the quality of the system. That description is not too far removed from
the federal election law or the standard proposals for campaign finance
reform. Contributions of less than certain amounts are permitted because of
an assumption that they are not harmful. Those amounts are currently set at
$1000 for individuals and $5000 for corporations and other organizations,
though whether those amounts are too high or too low is constantly
debated, just as the similar standards in environmental laws are debated.
The law prohibits contributions beyond those limits. But unlike in the
environmental context, there is no mechanism for obtaining a variance or a
permit to contribute more money upon a showing that such money would
not be harmful. Perhaps as a result, contributors have developed many
strategies for avoiding the limits while satisfying the letter of the law.
The image of pollution has further implications for the kind of response
that is appropriate. The disclosure of contribution and spending information
is desirable for the same reasons that prompt environmental right-to-know
laws. Likewise, when Drew would rely more on shame to pressure
politicians to do the right thing,'56 she echoes the calls of environmental
groups for corporations to stop polluting the air or the water and for
individuals to boycott those firms that offer no hint that they are ashamed of
what they do.
Finally, the pollution metaphor offers a vehicle for bridging Drew's
distinct concerns about the campaign finance system and the incivility,
partisanship, and other ills that plague American politics. The Washington
political environment has been described as "polluted" by politicians and
observers alike.'57 This description should encourage consideration of what
outside agents are producing the pollution, a task that is necessary given
Drew's inability to explain why American politics have become
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); see RODGERS, supra note 130, at 342-55 (describing the
application of the CWA's water quality standards).
156. See DREW, supra note 5, at 268 ("One of the strongest motivations for politicians is
embarrassment. The more attention paid to their corrupt or even questionable transactions-the
more exposure that there is of them-the more pressed they are likely to feel to change the
rules.").
157. See, e.g., Bush Promises To 'Change the Tone' of Washington as President, at
http://www.georgewbush.comlnews/2000/april/prO4 2 6 0 0 _tone.asp (last modified Apr. 26, 2000)
(asserting that "it's time to clean up the toxic environment in Washington, D.C."); Burt Solomon
& W. John Moore, Hometown Boy, 31 NAT'L J. 1872, 1878 (1999) (reporting the statement of
political consultant James Carville asserting that the issue is not whether Al Gore is a Washington
insider, but "whether he's been polluted" by his time in Washington).
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dysfunctional.'58 Moreover, just as a natural environment can be injured by
a number of distinct environmental pollutants, so can American politics be
seen as suffering from a number of unrelated causes. Identifying those
pollutants and their effects can be just as difficult as isolating the role of
specific environmental pollutants in the water or the air. The pollution
metaphor thus explains how Drew can perceive the distinct harms to
American politics even as it confirms the difficulty in showing how those
harms have occurred.
D. The Cultural Pollution Analogy to Campaign Finance
Thus far, the implications of the pollution metaphor have been limited
to environmental pollution. But environmental pollution is not the only kind
of pollution, either in the colloquial understanding of "pollution" or in the
eyes of the law. Noise and light pollution are subject to increasing federal,
state, and local regulation. The word "pollution" has also been used to
characterize a variety of objectionable effects, including suburban sprawl,
billboards, smells from hog farms, and tourists. The most significant
analogy for campaign finance reform, though, is to cultural pollution.
The term "cultural pollution" refers to the ways in which the
introduction of certain messages harms the cultural environment in which
we live. The most common offender is the entertainment industry. Movies,
television programs, video games, and music that are violent, sexually
suggestive, racist, or materialist have all been singled out as instances of
cultural pollution.' 9 The complaints became most frequent in the aftermath
of the Columbine High School tragedy in which twelve students and one
teacher were killed by two classmates who allegedly were inspired by
numerous violent images. Senator Joseph Lieberman and William Bennett
joined to award several corporations "Silver Sewer Awards" that are
designed "to identify the nation's worst cultural polluters." 160 Presidential
candidates of all stripes railed against cultural pollution, Congress
158. Supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
159. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Report on Marketing Violent Entertainment to
Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th
Cong. (2000) (testimony of Sen. Hatch), http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/O913hat.pdf
("In Utah, we reclaim abandoned coal mines. Why can't we even acknowledge that there hasbeen a mental and moral waste dump created from our over infatuation with television, movies,
and music?"); 145 CONG. REC. S4421 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Brownback)
(describing violent video games as -cultural pollution"); 142 CONG. REC. 12,627 (1996)(statement of Rep. Hoke) ("The price we pay as a community [for cable television pornography]
is the pollution of our culture and trashing of Judeo-Christian values ...."); Morton M.
Kondracke, Bush, Gore Silent as Popular Culture Gets Ever Coarser, ROLL CALL, Apr. 3, 2000,
2000 WL 8734054 (" [T]wo new reports confirm that the entertainment industry is spewing out
cultural pollution at an accelerating rate ....").
160. Press Release, Joe Lieberman, Silver Sewer Award: Bennett, Lieberman Dishonor Fox
Television with Latest (Sept. 14, 1999), LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
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considered legislation to control such pollution, and even entertainment
executives acknowledged the validity of the analogy. 6 ' In the words of Rob
Reiner, "these violent movies that are made poison the soul. They pollute
the culture." 162 The notion is that people can be injured when the culture in
which they live is filled with harmful images and speech, just as people can
be injured when they breathe dirty air or contaminated water.
Yet cultural pollution generally escapes legal regulation. Whereas the
legal response to environmental pollution supports more stringent
regulation of campaign contributions, the cultural pollution analogy points
in the opposite direction. The contested nature of what constitutes cultural
pollution provides another common justification for the refusal to regulate
sources of such pollution. But the polluting effect of money is contested,
too. The empirical studies of the influence of campaign funding on the
political and legislative process have yielded far more mixed results than
the studies of the effect of violent television programs on children.163 The
evidence in support of such injuries is far more convincing than the
evidence of the monetary influence or distortion of the legislative process
caused by campaign contributions. The indignation that movie producers
and video game manufacturers express when charged with producing
cultural pollution simply echoes the outrage that Senator Craig voiced at the
suggestion that his legislative decisions were influenced by campaign
contributors.
The First Amendment offers the principal reason why efforts to
regulate violent movies, pornography, hate speech, and indecency on the
Internet have failed. Current First Amendment doctrine permits the
regulation of such speech only if it satisfies the exceedingly demanding test
for "fighting words" or obscenity that is beyond the protection of the First
Amendment.1 64 Any government effort to block a violent, hateful, or
pornographic movie or television program before it is aired will fail as an
unconstitutional prior restraint. 65 Any effort to impose liability on, for
161. E.g., The Beltway Boys (Fox News Network Television broadcast, July 3, 1999),
LEXIS, News Folder, Transcripts File (interview with Gary Bauer); Remarks as Prepared for
Delivery by Al Gore, University of New Hampshire, Durham, http://www.gore2OO0.org/speeches/
speeches unh_052399.html (last modified May 22, 1999) (advocating giving "parents the tools to
allow their children to watch the good programming without being polluted by the bad").
162. CNN Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, May 10, 1999).
163. See, e.g., JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING VIOLENCE, at xvii (1998) (detailing the
studies demonstrating the relationship between television and violence in children and asserting
"that television violence is fundamentally a problem of pollution").
164. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (reversing a conviction for burning an
American flag because the act could not be viewed "as a direct personal insult or an invitation to
exchange fisticuffs"); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscenity is not
protected speech within the meaning of the First Amendment).
165. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (stating that "prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights").
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example, a producer whose movie inspired violent acts is unlikely to
succeed. The egregiousness of the most recent exception to the general rule
against the imposition of liability on those characterized as cultural
polluters-Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, in which the Fourth Circuit held a
publisher liable for a murder committed by someone who followed the step-
by-step instructions in the Hit Man manual1 6 -shows how unlikely it is
that any effort to regulate cultural pollution will survive the First
Amendment. Moreover, the notion of the appearance of cultural pollution
has gained no traction in the law. The perception that violent, sexually
explicit, or hateful entertainment media are harmful is widespread, but the
perception itself has not been credited as a justification for any regulation
that raises First Amendment concerns.
Regulation of the "pollution" of campaign money has been more
fortunate. According to Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the level of
scrutiny for campaign finance regulations is uncertain, but it assuredly is
not the strict scrutiny that applies to any effort to regulate violent movies,
hate speech, and other speech.'67 Why the Court hesitates to invoke strict
scrutiny-as the Shrink Missouri Government PAC dissenters demand-is
unstated. Why Justice Breyer does not do so is better known. He refuses to
invoke strict scrutiny because of the seriousness of the harms that such
regulation is designed to address. 6 ' Indeed, he offers the scary suggestion
that the appropriate constitutional test should be measured by the ability of
desirable campaign finance reforms to satisfy it. 69 There is no similar
suggestion of a test fashioned to permit the regulation of cultural pollution.
The differential treatment of cultural pollution and campaign finance
pollution is hard to justify. Both types of pollution involve real harms,
contested causal relationships, and disagreements about whether they can
be fairly characterized as pollution at all. Yet they are subject to
dramatically different constitutional tests. Imagine, for example, that
166. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). Note that many publishers and other groups strenuously
opposed liability under even these facts. Id. at 265. The court remarked:
That the national media organizations would feel obliged to vigorously defend
Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to intentionally and knowingly assist
murderers with technical information which Paladin admits it intended and knew would
be used immediately in the commission of murder and other crimes against society is,
to say the least, breathtaking.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
167. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 903, 907 (2000) (acknowledging that
[p]recision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a
pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion," but declining to specify an exact standard).
168. id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (resisting strict scrutiny because "this is a case where
constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation").
169. Id. at 913-14 (suggesting that "the Constitution would require us to reconsider Buckley'"
if that decision "denies the political branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive solutions
to the problems posed by campaign finance"). I term this suggestion scary because I know of no
other instance in which a Justice has suggested that a particular desired policy result should
determine the appropriate interpretation of the Constitution.
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Congress sought to impose a $1000 per person limit on investments in
movie productions. It is inconceivable that such a statute would survive
First Amendment scrutiny, yet that is an exact analogue to the FECA
restriction on individual campaign contributions. And the difficulty exists
whether the problem is viewed as pollution or as corruption. Violent,
pornographic, or hateful movies and television shows are often described as
corrupting our culture instead of polluting it, yet nothing in First
Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the government can restrict speech
or spending on speech in order to prevent cultural corruption. The question,
then, becomes which constitutional test is appropriate: subjecting campaign
contributions to the strict scrutiny imposed on the regulation of violent
movies, pornography, and hate speech; or extending the more relaxed test
suggested in Shrink Missouri Government PAC to those forms of cultural
pollution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Elizabeth Drew brings thirty years of experience in Washington to her
conclusion that American politics-and especially our system of financing
campaigns-has become corrupt. Perhaps she is right. It is sobering to
consider how many people agree with her or simply assume that she must
be right. There are still many unbelievers, though, and there are still many
days like last October 14 when the focus is on the word "corruption"
instead of the broader questions that Drew's critique raises. The ongoing
debate also questions the efficacy of the proposals to regulate political
campaigns further that have been offered by Senator McCain and endorsed
by Drew.
The pollution metaphor offers a means of ending that stalemate. Seeing
campaign money as analogous to environmental pollution would encourage
lawmakers to focus on the amount of money that the system can tolerate
and the best way to eliminate the harm that too much money can cause.
Seeing campaign money as cultural pollution reminds lawmakers that the
First Amendment concerns raised by limiting contributions and spending
are even more serious than the Court indicated in Shrink Missouri
Government PAC. I have elsewhere articulated a proposal to eliminate the
influence of campaign money on the legislative process, and the pollution
metaphor shows how that proposal achieves Drew's goals while honoring
the First Amendment.
That is not to say that seeing the problem as an instance of pollution
will serve as a panacea for the debate about campaign finance reform.
"Pollution" is often no easier to define than "corruption," as the ongoing
debates about cultural pollution demonstrate. Members of Congress and
their contributors are unlikely to be more pleased about contributing to
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pollution than to corruption. And the metaphor will be useful only if it
persuades lawmakers-including people voting on state initiative
measures-that pollution exists and that there are effective and permissible
means of controlling it.
There is evidence that the pollution metaphor can be persuasive. It
responds to the popular belief that money somehow renders the system
unclean. That image is similar to the theory of corruption as monetary
influence, but it focuses on the idea that the problem is created by the
introduction of money into a system that is otherwise "pure." That focus, in
turn, encourages further study of exactly what constitutes such a pure
political system and when money alters it for the worse. Such a fresh
perspective is the best way to begin to address the problems that have long
troubled Elizabeth Drew and that divided the Senate on October 14, 1999.

